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Intellectual Perfectionism about Schooling
BEN KOTZEE
ABSTRACT In education, character education is a burgeoning ﬁeld; however, it is also the
target of considerable criticism. Amongst criticisms of character education, the political criti-
cism that character education is a form of indoctrination stands out. In particular, the charge
is made against character education that it breaches the principle of liberal neutrality about
the good. In this article I discuss liberal approaches to character education. I outline the two
most prominent liberal approaches to character education in school, liberal neutralism and lib-
eral perfectionism, as we ﬁnd it in the work of Clayton (neutralism) and Levinson (liberal
perfectionism). I hold that the two standard liberal approaches do not distinguish carefully
enough between two possible forms of character education – moral character education and
intellectual character education. Drawing on recent work in virtue epistemology, I hold that
the liberal position tacitly demands intellectual character education. Regarding moral charac-
ter education, however, I hold that the picture appears different. In the ﬁnal analysis, I advo-
cate a new form of perfectionism regarding character education that I call ‘intellectual
perfectionism’. According to intellectual perfectionism, schools should be perfectionist regarding
children’s intellects, but neutralist regarding their morals.
1. Introduction
In recent years, the character education agenda has shaped education policy on both
sides of the Atlantic in important ways. In the United Kingdom, the Department for
Education has begun to encourage schools to promote virtues like perseverance, conﬁ-
dence, motivation, drive, neighbourliness, tolerance, honesty, and conscientiousness
amongst children.1 In the United States, character education programmes are regu-
larly touted as the solution to the country’s democratic crisis and behavioural prob-
lems in the country’s schools.2 A variety of interventions have begun to be used there,
including programmes to promote ‘grit’ and ‘resilience’ modelled on training provided
by the US Army.3 A number of well-known objections to character education exist in
the literature, for instance: that it focuses on the wrong virtues, that it does not work
and that it is the business of parents, not schools.4 Of all the objections to character
education programmes in school, one class of objection stands out. This is the politi-
cal objection by, for instance, Kohn, that character education is ‘tantamount to indoc-
trination’ and represents schools meddling with the values that children (or their
families) should decide for themselves.5
Why is character education politically controversial? A natural answer can be found
in the liberal idea that the state should not promote any one particular ideal of the
good life, but should let citizens choose their own ‘comprehensive conception’ of how
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to live. However, within the broadly liberal camp dispute remains about how exactly
to think about schools’ efforts to shape the character of the children who go there.
According to liberal neutralists, schools should not promote any particular conception
of the good amongst children, but should be neutral with regard to the values orienta-
tion it promotes amongst children. According to liberal perfectionists, however, pro-
moting liberalism is itself to promote a particular comprehensive conception amongst
children. Rather than barring schools from shaping the child’s character, liberal perfec-
tionists wish to circumscribe the values that schools can inculcate and limit these to
the ones necessary to promote a liberal order.
In this article I discuss liberal approaches to character education as it plays out in
debates between liberal neutralists and liberal perfectionists.6 For liberals of both
stripes, the essential puzzle about education is how we can justify making education
compulsory for children who do not freely choose to be educated. I hold that both lib-
eral neutralists and liberal perfectionists struggle with this problem in different ways.
The problem, as I see it, is that both liberal neutralists and liberal perfectionists do
not distinguish carefully enough between shaping children’s moral and intellectual char-
acter and, as an alternative to both liberal neutralism and liberal perfectionism, I pro-
vide a defence of a different weak perfectionist position regarding education:
‘intellectual perfectionism’. According to ‘intellectual perfectionism’ the task of the lib-
eral school is to develop the child’s intellectual, rather than their moral character. I
hold that intellectual perfectionism captures much that advocates of liberal neutralism
and liberal perfectionism will ﬁnd attractive; I also hold that intellectual perfectionism
captures best the unique role of the school.
2. Liberal Neutrality about Education
According to the principle of liberal neutrality about the good, as we ﬁnd it in John
Rawls’s Political Liberalism, the state should be neutral with respect to the kinds of life
that its citizens lead.7 According to Rawls, the role of the state is not to promote living
a certain kind of life – even a good life. Rather, the role of the state is to secure all cit-
izens as much freedom as possible to form their own comprehensive conception of the
good life and pursue it. Rawls holds that if it is to regulate the public realm to pro-
mote both justice and individual freedom, the state must be neutral regarding individ-
uals’ own private life projects: it must not promote any conceptions of the good
beyond that necessary to keep public life ‘well-ordered’.8
Those like Clayton who apply the liberal neutrality principle to thinking about edu-
cation hold that the same stricture applies to the school: the school should only pro-
mote values and orientations that are strictly necessary to uphold the liberal order and
should be neutral about all further comprehensive questions. Clayton situates the mat-
ter in the context of perfectionist and anti-perfectionist approaches to upbringing.
According to perfectionists, it is morally permissible for those who play a role in bring-
ing up children (such as parents or teachers) to shape children’s view about what the
good life is and to help them live such a life.9 For anti-perfectionists,10 it is not allow-
able to shape children’s comprehensive conception of the good life in this way.
Clayton’s anti-perfectionism brings him into immediate conﬂict with the character
education movement. The dominant conception of character education as it has taken
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shape in the UK, the USA and further aﬁeld is as a form of education that attempts to
shape children’s moral character in such a way that they can ﬂourish as individuals. A
number of educational philosophers, including De Ruyter, Brighouse, White, Curren
and Kristjansson, explicitly defend ﬂourishing as the aim of education.11 According to
these views, the fundamental purpose of the school is indeed to ‘perfect’ children’s
skills, capabilities, moral outlook or whole lives in such a way that they can live the
best life possible.
Now, moral character is almost paradigmatic of what Rawls thinks belongs to a per-
son’s private life (as opposed to their public life). He writes that the private includes:
. . . conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal charac-
ter, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relation-
ships . . .12 (emphasis mine)
The main reason Clayton holds the state should refrain from trying to promote citi-
zens’ wellbeing through education is that individuals should not be coerced by their
schools or teachers into making personal choices about how to live their lives. Rather,
they should make these choices independently. Clayton writes at length about the nat-
ure of independence or autonomy, but, in the end, supports a simple and compelling
view:
. . . a person’s independence is violated when others determine the ends she
pursues or serves, period.13
A clear problem for Clayton’s view is that children do not tend to make autono-
mous choices about their own schooling; when young, they are simply not in the posi-
tion autonomously to choose how they are schooled. Clayton concedes that not all
children are in a position to make judgements of their own about their education.
However, children mature to adulthood and can, once they have become adults, retro-
spectively give consent to the education they have received. Clayton repeatedly stresses
the importance of informed consent to independence.14 He draws a parallel between
children who are too young to give consent to being taught anything and people who
are temporarily unable to give consent to some kind of medical treatment. He cites
the following example in support.
Fertility Fix: Amy is rendered unconscious by an accident and is undergoing
surgery to save her life. In the course of the operation the surgeon discovers
that Amy is infertile and ﬁxes that as well.15
As Clayton points out, waking up from the surgery, Amy is not likely retrospectively
to reject that the surgeons saved her life; however, she may very well reject the fertility
ﬁx. Clayton thinks the same is the case with children and the education they receive.
If the school teaches a certain comprehensive conception of the good – say, a certain
religious teaching about the meaning of life – it is possible that, in future, the child
may reject that teaching, making this religious teaching a violation of their autonomy.
However, if the school teaches children something that they are never likely to reject –
like, say, being able to read or write – this is no violation of their autonomy. Clayton
in effect proposes a future rejection standard for what is permissible to teach at school:
if a piece of curricular content is liable to be rejected when the child reaches adult-
hood, it is not permissible for schools to teach it.
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Unfortunately for Clayton, such a standard does not work well for deciding the per-
missibility of teaching children certain things at school. In one sense, the standard is
far too strict for real life application. To see this, note that thousands of adults in
actual fact reject large swathes of what they had been taught at school – think of the
many people who complain that what they were taught in history class at school was
misleading, or what they were taught in algebra is irrelevant. If possible future rejec-
tion made something impermissible to teach, precious little curricular content would
remain allowable to teach. In another sense, the standard is too weak to draw the kind
of distinctions that Clayton wants to draw. Take the case of being taught a certain set
of values in school. No-one is likely retrospectively to complain that the school turned
them into someone who is honest, or kind, brave, fair, or humble. The point is that if
one is genuinely kind, brave, fair or humble, one also values being kind, brave, fair or
humble. It follows that learning to become genuinely kind, brave, fair or humble rules
out that one will ever reject what one learned. In the end, it seems that, if the school
only does its job of moral education well enough and it teaches children both what
values to hold and also manages to convince them that these values are good to the
extent that they will not reject them as adults, then perfectionist moral character edu-
cation would be allowable by Clayton’s standard. In short, we cannot ﬁx liberal neu-
tralism’s problem of gaining children’s consent to their education by relying on
children’s future consent to their education, because that very education will itself
shape the likelihood whether they give their consent to their education in future or
not.
3. Liberal Perfectionism about Education
Against Clayton’s anti-perfectionist neutralism about education stands the perfectionist
position called ‘liberal perfectionism’. Liberal perfectionists like Gutmann and Levin-
son hold that it is not a brute fact that children are autonomous and that their auton-
omy should (therefore) be respected.16 Rather, autonomy is itself a good that should
be nurtured and developed through education. Against liberal neutralists, who hold
that the state should not support the development of any particular conception of the
good life amongst citizens, liberal perfectionists hold that to be fully autonomous is
itself to have a ‘comprehensive conception’ because it involves valuing one’s own and
others’ autonomy.17
Levinson argues that, even on Rawls’s own picture, autonomy is not a neutral char-
acteristic of people, but is a good – a virtue – that should be developed.18 As we saw
above, Rawls stresses that under conditions of freedom, people will inevitably come to
hold very different views regarding what the good life is. This is the problem of plural-
ism and, in a world characterised by pluralism, people will have to engage in a form of
civic compromise in which they (1) accept that others will differ in their views of the
good life (2) understand others’ views and (3) attempt to negotiate and compromise
with other people regarding how to live, while (4) knowing full well that the issue of
how best to live is hard to settle. Rawls calls this quandary the ‘burdens of judge-
ment’.19 Now, it is clearly not good enough for the burdens of judgement to exist in
the abstract; for them to have an inﬂuence over people’s actions, people must take on
board dealing with these burdens as a personal commitment. If one accepts the
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burdens of judgement, one is already committed to valuing one’s own and others’
autonomy.
Levinson observes that protecting and promoting the liberal order requires of the
state to develop autonomy (as a good) amongst future citizens – children.20 The most
natural site at which the state can develop autonomy is the school. As Levinson
acknowledges, however, schooling children for autonomy poses a particular problem
of justiﬁcation. Schooling is compulsory, and children do not choose for the develop-
ment of their autonomy. The ‘puzzle of autonomy’, as Levinson puts it, is that in
order to develop children’s autonomy, society must ﬁrst take autonomy away by forc-
ing children to attend school and there to submit to an education they do not particu-
larly want.21 The neutralist response to the problem of autonomy, of course, is to
prohibit the undue shaping of children’s comprehensive conceptions by the school; the
neutralist justiﬁcation for this is that children have not chosen those comprehensive
conceptions themselves. Levinson is doubtful about this neutralist ‘protection’ strat-
egy, however. She holds that protections against state perfectionism are typically
designed to weaken the hands of teachers and schools in forcing their conceptions of
the good on children; however, the less power teachers and schools have to inﬂuence
children’s conceptions of the good, the more power children’s parents have to impose
their particular conceptions of the good on children.22 Because it seems that someone
will inﬂuence children’s comprehensive conception no matter what we do, Levinson
argues that schools should have the liberal perfectionist power to develop children’s
autonomy as a counterweight to the (less liberal) perfectionist projects of children’s
parents.
Levinson suggests that, to be autonomous, one must ﬁrst be a person with a set of
one’s own priorities, values and commitments (she mentions emotional, intellectual,
spiritual and aesthetic commitments). In addition, one must also have the faculties to
reﬂect on these commitments: she speciﬁcally mentions critical thinking skills and self-
knowledge as foundational to such reﬂection. Finally, she identiﬁes autonomy as:
. . . the process of reﬂecting upon our beliefs and desires, attempting to
resolve such incoherences as are troubling, and revising our preferences in
light of self-critical reﬂection that makes one’s beliefs and desires our own –
that permits us to claim that we truly are self-legislating.23
While Levinson holds that autonomy is valuable, it is important to note that she
actually has a fairly weak account of how far autonomy should be promoted. She holds
that, while the task of the school is to make autonomous choice possible for everyone,
there is no demand that everyone must become highly individual or heterodox in their
world view – it must only be the case that they are able to reﬂect on and adjust their
world view should they wish. In a passage that will appeal to Clayton too, she writes:
In promoting the development of autonomy, the state is not claiming that the
autonomous way of life is the only legitimate way of life, or that autonomy is
a prerequisite for citizenship. It is simply trying to right the balance of power
by giving individuals the ability in their adult lives to do what they could not
do as children – speciﬁcally, to determine their own values and to adopt a
conception of the good with which they identify (as opposed to those with
which they happened as children to be identiﬁed).24
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3.1 From Autonomy to Rational Thinking
In the end Clayton and Levinson differ over neutralism and perfectionism; however,
there is a marked similarity in how they see the role of education. The main difference
between Clayton and Levinson’s position seems to be whether we call the capacity to
make this kind of choice ‘valuable’ or ‘good’ and are happy to see schools as self-con-
sciously nurturing and promoting it (Levinson) or whether one sees it as an ability or
capacity that people have as a matter of right and that other people (including parents
and teachers) should accept and respect (Clayton). For both Levinson and Clayton,
the point of education is that the child should become able,25 after they have received
an education, to reﬂect on the education they had and the world-view that that educa-
tion has left them with. If the child approves (after having received their particular
form of education) of that educational experience, temporarily over-ruling their auton-
omy by making them undergo it would have been justiﬁed; if not, not.
Above we already noted the problem that the backwards-looking approach to justify-
ing schooling creates for Clayton. Recall Clayton’s future rejection standard: if one
coerces children both into adopting some kind of comprehensive conception and one
manipulates their feelings about it, it is possible to coerce children to adopt a set of
values that they will not reject in future. The same problem rears its head for Levinson
in a slightly different guise: this is that what might seem like autonomy to the child
later in their life may simply be their unimaginatively endorsing the values that were
forced on them as children.
Levinson worries about parents’ perfectionist projects and proposes that teachers’ per-
fectionism can work to cancel out parents’ jaundiced projects. She has in mind examples
(like the decision in Mozert v Hawkins) where the courts have compelled parents from a
religiously conservative group to keep their children in a public education programme.26
Levinson thinks that, where parents from closed religious communities are not likely to
enhance children’s autonomy, the American public school should step in to do it. The
problem for Levinson is that school perfectionism only ameliorates parental perfection-
ism when the school has a demonstrably better comprehensive agenda than children’s
parents do. This may have been so for the Mozert parents, but it is not always the case.
Sometimes, school and parents do not have different perfectionist agendas, but the same
perfectionist agenda. When this is the case, school perfectionism will reinforce parental
perfectionism rather than cancel it out. Moreover, even where school and parents do
have completely different perfectionist agendas, who is to say that the school’s perfec-
tionist agenda is necessarily better than that of the parents? Imagine the child from some
Luddite community in rural America, whose parents attempt to enlist the child into their
unsophisticated but peaceable way of life. Imagine that, in the name of autonomy, the
courts force the child to go to public school in the nearby town where the teachers try to
enlist them in (say) the projects of originalism, exceptionalism and blind loyalty to the
ﬂag. Even though that school may have a different perfectionist project from the child’s
parents, the courts may simply send the child from the frying pan to the ﬁre.
Levinson’s answer is that the task of the school is to teach the children a plural cur-
riculum, that is for the school to teach sufﬁciently many varied options regarding how
to live, and also to teach the children the imagination and thinking skills to be able to
discern accurately whether their education (at home or at school) was any good. But
this is exactly the point, for the difference is not made by the school teaching (1) many
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plural views or indeed (2) views that are different from their parents’ views, or even,
(3) reﬂection as such. The difference is made by the quality of the views taught –
whether they are sensible or not – and by the quality of the reﬂective thinking abilities
that the school fosters.
To illustrate the indispensable role that the rational content and quality of what is
taught plays in deciding whether a form of education is justiﬁed or not, Fowler distin-
guishes between three cases in which the state must pick sides over what a child is to
be taught by their parents or by their school:
(1) A case where education involves outright abuse of a child – say, a parent or
teacher employs corporal punishment as part of their teaching strategy.
(2) A case where a parent or teacher teaches something that is seemingly politi-
cally reasonable, but that results in real harm to a child – Fowler mentions
the case of the ‘fruitarian’ parents whose nutritional strategy resulted in their
baby dying of malnutrition in 2001.
(3) A case in which a child is not harmed in the physical sense, but is nonetheless
taught something objectionable – Fowler gives the example of a school that
teaches children that homosexuals will go to hell.27
While most liberals would be comfortable outlawing the teaching of (1) and perhaps
also the upbringing envisaged under (2), the situation becomes more difﬁcult in case
(3). If the school not only teaches that homosexuals will go to hell, but also advocates
violence against homosexuals, this view is clearly not politically reasonable and Rawls
would reject it; but what if the school teaches no earthly discrimination against homo-
sexuals whatsoever, but merely teaches that, at the day of ﬁnal judgement it is a sad
fact that the homosexuals will go to hell?28 Would the Rawlsian liberal be comfortable
outlawing teaching (3)? Fowler holds that, because such a view does not necessarily
clash with purely political reasonableness, the Rawlsian would have no ground to out-
law teaching this; yet, as Fowler points out, teaching something like this might very
well harm a child: take the doubt, guilt and shame engendered in the child who feels
same-sex attraction but is told that they will burn for it. In short, more than just being
politically reasonable, what is taught in school must pass a test of rationality.
Adapting Fowler’s example a little to our case, it will make no difference if the
school and parents each simply teach something different about homosexuality. School
and parents can teach different things that are both wrong. Neither does the school
teaching a plurality of things make a difference as such; the school can teach a whole
menu of things about homosexuality that are all wrong. The school may even teach
both the right and the wrong thing about homosexuality as part of a plural menu of
views, but may not help the child see which is the right view. The point is that what
form of education will truly enhance a child’s freedom, and which not, can only be
judged by paying attention to whether what is taught is rational or epistemically justi-
ﬁed.29 Mere difference or plurality is not good enough.
What we want from a school education, in a phrase, is to teach children how to think
and reason about the world, that is, how to be rational. We do not simply seek their own
later buy-in to what they were taught (Clayton) and neither do we simply demand that
children are taught a plurality of views (Levinson). The liberal position about justifying
education actually relies on promoting children’s abilities to think rationally. What is
needed in the liberal framework is not only a political discussion about how the state
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should regulate education, but an epistemological discussion about the nature of the
good thinking processes that should be promoted through education.
4. The Intellectual Virtue Alternative
The problem that began this article is: what attitude should liberals take to character
education? Liberals from the neutralist and the perfectionist camps are sceptical about
the project of strong perfectionists who think that schools must shape children’s char-
acter and world-view comprehensively. Instead, they suggest proscribing perfectionism
completely (Clayton) or limiting perfectionism to the fostering of autonomy (Levin-
son). But strongly perfectionist moral character education is not the only kind of char-
acter education that schools can provide. Baehr (2013) reminds us that, in Aristotle’s
theory of the virtues, there are two large classes of virtue – the moral and the intellec-
tual virtues. In fact, Baehr advocates intellectual character education exactly on the
basis that it is more politically acceptable than moral character education. He writes:
. . . ‘intellectual character education’ as we might call it, sidesteps one of the
main objections raised against more traditional approaches to character edu-
cation. Some object to these approaches on the grounds that they rely on con-
troversial notions of morality that are out of place in public education. This
objection has little force against the attempt to educate for intellectual
virtues. . . [I]ntellectual virtues are the character traits required for good think-
ing and learning. They presuppose no controversial moral commitments.30
At this juncture, it is useful to remind ourselves of how Aristotle describes the nature
of virtue and its cultivation. Aristotle distinguishes between the moral and the intellectual
virtues at the beginning of Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics. For Aristotle, the two
forms of virtue belong to different parts of the soul – the moral virtues belong to the ‘de-
siring’ and the intellectual virtues to the ‘rational’ part of the soul.31 While not always
discussed in the same depth as Aristotle’s moral virtues, it is clear that Aristotle had a
very intellectual picture of virtue and the good life. For instance, towards the end of
Book VI, Aristotle makes it clear that it is the intellectual virtue of phronesis that brings
moral virtue to full virtue; and in Book X he goes further to hold that philosophic wis-
dom (sophia) is the highest form of wisdom (higher even than phronesis).32
More than just being different, Aristotle holds that intellectual and moral virtue are
acquired in different ways. He writes:
. . . intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teach-
ing . . . while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit. . .33
Aristotle clearly thought that intellectual virtue was the kind of thing that one can
teach, but he had his doubts about the direct teachability of moral virtue, holding that
the moral virtues are learned by example and practice. That this was Aristotle’s view
of the school is given some practical backing by his own approach to education. It is
well known that the Nicomachean Ethics was adapted from his lectures on ethics given
at the Lyceum. Aristotle intended the NE to be studied by (and his Lyceum to be
attended by) morally relatively well-developed students who had already absorbed the
moral virtues (most likely from their home environment). Rather than teaching them
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moral virtue at the Lyceum, Aristotle thought he could only teach children who had
already acquired the moral virtues how to think about virtue theoretically. As Hughes
puts it, Aristotle thought that his own role as teacher was only to:
. . . provide the ﬁnal stage of a process of moral education . . . to give the theo-
retical backing to a process of moral training which had already been largely
completed.34
In sum, no one less than Aristotle asserts that only the intellectual and not the
moral virtues can truly be taught. Moreover, circumstantially it seems that his attitude
to his own teaching practice was rather more intellectually perfecting than truly
‘morally enlisting’. The prospects for a retrieval of Aristotle’s position begin to look
enticing. Should we not say, in parallel with this understanding of Aristotle, that
school is for the development of children’s intellectual virtues rather than for the devel-
opment of their moral virtues?
5. What is Intellectual Character Education?
Recently, a number of philosophers working in the virtue-epistemology tradition have
suggested that the aim of education is the development of the intellectual virtues
amongst children.35 The intellectual virtues are those features of a person’s cognitive
character that characterise her as a thinker; examples of intellectual virtues are curios-
ity, open-mindedness, accuracy, rigour, intellectual courage, and intellectual honesty.
In the virtue epistemology tradition, there are two ways of thinking about the nature
of a person’s cognitive character. According to the ‘reliabilist’ tradition associated
with, for instance Sosa and Greco the intellectual virtues are best understand as reli-
able cognitive faculties like, good sight, good hearing, accurate memory, etc.36 On the
other hand, ‘responsibilist’ virtue epistemologists, like for instance Montmarquet and
Zagzebski, see the intellectual virtues more like intellectual character traits, that is,
one’s ‘good habits’ in thinking.37 Just like patience, gratitude, kindness and so on are
good moral character traits, so being curious, open-minded, accurate, exacting, hon-
est, etc. are good intellectual character traits. Importantly, proponents of the intellec-
tual virtue approach in education hold that we should develop the second kind of
intellectual virtue. This is because the reliabilist virtues (such as how well one sees or
hears) are to a large extent ‘natural’ or inborn and not amenable to much improve-
ment, whereas the responsibilist virtues are exactly the kind of thing that can be
improved through education and that one can probably only acquire through a process
of learning. For this reason, I also focus on the responsibilist virtues.
Baehr gives the following deﬁnition of intellectual virtue:
Intellectual Virtue: for any intellectual virtue V, a subject S possesses V only if
S is: (a) disposed to manifest a certain activity or psychology characteristic of
V (b) out of a love of epistemic goods.38
On this model, an individual is open-minded (say) only if she is disposed to mani-
fest the good habits of thinking involved in open-mindedness (say, considering alterna-
tive viewpoints thoroughly and without prejudice) out of a love for epistemic goods
(say, out of a love of exploring matters deeply and arriving at the right conclusion).
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Integrating these points, then, the intellectual virtue approach to education is that it is
the task of education to (1) teach children to be intellectually virtuous – that is to have
certain good habits of thinking out of (2) a love of epistemic goods (like truth, knowl-
edge and understanding).
While this approach is by now well known, so far no-one has situated this proposal
that schools should focus on the inculcation of the intellectual virtues in this political
terrain of deciding whether schools should or should not be allowed to teach children
a comprehensive conception and exactly what that conception should be. We can now
state the proposed position in full. Clayton holds that, on liberal grounds, teachers
should not shape children’s comprehensive views at all. On different liberal grounds,
Levinson holds that schools can only shape children’s autonomy (nothing else).
Adapting an old and respectable view – Aristotle’s view that there is a difference
between the intellectual and the moral virtues and that we should think differently
about how to inculcate these different forms of virtue – I propose a different answer.
Intellectual perfectionism: The aim of schooling is to pursue one and only one
perfectionist project and that is fostering intellectual virtue among the chil-
dren who go there.
The view is that we should be perfectionists about children’s intellects, but neutral-
ists about their morals.
The proposal on the table is an alternative, weak form of perfectionism that should
hold intuitive appeal both for liberal neutrals and for liberal perfectionists. Because
such an approach explicitly cuts out state interference in children’s conception of how
they should live their life in the moral, political or religious sense, it may assuage neu-
tralists’ worries about coercion. And, because of the clear link between being able to
think for oneself and individual autonomy, it may also appeal to liberal perfectionists
like Levinson (and Gutmann) on the basis that being able to think well and indepen-
dently will promote what they value (i.e. children’s autonomy). Let us consider the
prospects for an ‘intellectual perfectionism about education’ in more depth.
6. Liberalism and Intellectual Character Education
As we saw, the dispute between liberal neutralists and liberal perfectionists hinge on how
we should see autonomy: as an essentially value-neutral capacity that should be
respected or as a good – a virtue – that should be developed and promoted. Cognisant of
the danger that perfectionism might balloon out of control and become illiberal, ‘liberal’
or ‘weak’ perfectionists propose various restrictions on perfectionism. Thus, according
to Fowler’s ‘restricted perfectionism’ we should limit the state’s perfectionist projects to
children: he proposes ‘perfectionism for children and anti-perfectionism for adults.39
And as we saw, Levinson holds that we should draw a distinction between the perfection-
ist projects that parents may pursue and the perfectionist projects that schools may pur-
sue, because the one may balance out the other. Taking the conjunction of these points,
let us focus, then, on the most limited matter: the perfectionist projects that schools, in
particular, are or are not allowed to engage in with regard to children.
As I hold elsewhere, the essential task of the school is to ensure the reproduction
and advancement of human knowledge. Brieﬂy put, my argument is that the
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characteristic role of the school is to make sure that each new generation of people
takes on board: (a) the sum of human knowledge, (b) the means to improve that body
of knowledge and (c) the means to pass it on.40 If each generation does not do this,
human knowledge will be lost. With human knowledge having achieved a great degree
of sophistication and specialisation, this task can no longer be achieved by parents or
society informally; a dedicated epistemic institution like the school is needed to pass
on this knowledge. Furthermore, while there are many other things that children need
from society besides being inducted into human knowledge, there are other institu-
tions that can carry on these important societal functions concerning the upbringing of
children: families can house, clothe and feed children, the medical profession can keep
them healthy, the police can protect them, clubs and societies can enculturate them,
etc. The point is that the shaping of the intellect happens best in school and what the
school can do best (from amongst all its possible social roles) is shape the intellect.
This is why I focus, in my account, on the school as an institution concerned ﬁrst and
foremost with shaping children’s intellects.
Note that, in carrying out this task, we must distinguish between the task of the
school to pass on a speciﬁc body of human knowledge (such as knowledge of certain
scientiﬁc truths, knowledge of certain pieces of literature, knowledge of certain epi-
sodes in history, etc.) and its task in building children’s capacity for good thinking,
that is shaping their epistemic character. Following Dewey, I hold that the second is
as important as the ﬁrst because human knowledge is not static – it changes (hopefully
growing) over time.41 To the survival of human knowledge it is essential that each
new generation of knowers not only learns the most important pieces of knowledge
already discovered, but also acquires productive habits of thinking that will allow them
to correct and improve our stock of human knowledge. In this it is essential that mem-
bers of the new generation not only take knowledge on board, but also begin to love
knowledge. For one thing, without a love of knowledge one will not be particularly
meticulous in correcting and improving our stock of knowledge; for another, without a
love of knowledge, one will not be inclined to pass it on carefully to the next genera-
tion. The intellectual project of education is enlisting children (often against their
immediate inclination) into our intellectual culture and bringing them to love it so that
they will keep it alive, seek to correct and improve it and seek to pass it on. If this is
to be successful, young people need to learn not only speciﬁc bodies of theoretical or
practical knowledge, they need to become intellectually virtuous. As a comprehensive
ideal, I hold that teaching intellectual virtue is epistemically justiﬁed by the role that it
plays in the continuous social reproduction of knowledge.
In my other work, I offer an epistemic justiﬁcation for teaching the intellectual vir-
tues. Here, though, I wish to argue that intellectual perfectionism is also politically jus-
tiﬁed. The argument is that political liberalism (in both its neutralist and perfectionist
forms) actually demands the teaching of intellectual virtues because the intellectual vir-
tues enhance the kinds of autonomy that liberals would like to promote. To see this,
note the following two arguments (6.1 and 6.2).
6.1. Autonomy and Intellectual Character
As we have seen, Clayton acknowledges the view that autonomy is a precondition for
making free choices about the kind of life one is to lead. Indeed, he stresses that
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independence requires a capacity for a conception of the good, in Rawls’s sense. This
he calls the capacity to ‘deliberate rationally’ about one’s ends . . . and the ‘intellectual
and physical wherewithal to pursue the ends that they come to endorse’.42
A natural question to ask at this juncture is what the capacity for critical and
rational reﬂection is exactly, and how a person comes to have such a capacity. Clayton
sees autonomy as being able to form a conception of the good life for oneself in a
rational manner; he identiﬁes these capacities with children having ‘. . . the right kind
of intellectual powers critically to reﬂect upon their ethical lives . . .’.43 Likewise, in her
picture of autonomy, Levinson stresses that an important feature of an autonomous
person is their ability to ‘make and act upon rational decisions’ and she holds that the
traditionally recognised conditions for autonomy include critical thinking skills and
self-knowledge. Most importantly, Levinson holds that the autonomous person can
challenge and reﬂect upon their ﬁrst order desires.44 Summing up her view on auton-
omy, Levinson writes that:
. . . the ideal of personal autonomy is a substantive notion of higher-order
preference formation within a context of cultural coherence, plural constitu-
tive personal values and beliefs, openness to others’ evaluations of oneself,
and a sufﬁciently developed moral, spiritual or aesthetic, intellectual, and
emotional personality.45
Clearly, this ‘higher-order preference formation’ is engaging in a sophisticated kind
of thinking. While they do not foreground it, both Clayton and Levinson lean on an
idea of personal freedom as having developed intellectual virtues like curiosity, open-
mindedness and reﬂectiveness. The point is that what liberals call ‘autonomy’ should
be characterised by the way that one thinks.
Sketching autonomy as demanding a kind of thinking is a very well-established idea.
For instance, in his work on autonomy, Stanley Benn (whom Levinson draws on
extensively), holds that heteronomy involves adopting the norms and values of one’s
society unthinkingly and uncritically. Benn holds that, in contrast, autonomy amounts
to living by norms that are one’s own because one has assessed the choices open to
one and has weighed up their merits.46 In a phrase, autonomy involves thinking about
one’s choices for oneself. Going further than Benn, George Sher stresses that, in judg-
ing whether a person is autonomous, we must judge not only whether their thinking is
‘their own’, but must also take a view on whether their thinking is rational. Sher
writes:
. . .autonomous agents are self-directing in the. . . sense of exercising their will
on the basis of good reasons.47
The point is that in ordinary English as well as in theory, ‘autonomy’ is a virtue.
Moreover, along with associated notions like ‘open-mindedness’ and ‘independence’
(in the sense of ‘self-sufﬁciency’) it is an intellectual virtue because it has to do with
forming a conception of how to conduct oneself based on reasons that one assesses for
oneself. Autonomously choosing a way of life requires that a person be able to and
inclined to reason about the kind of life they wish to lead. If both Levinson and Clay-
ton are committed to enhancing autonomy through education, they are thereby
already ‘intellectually perfectionist’.
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6.2. Reasonableness, Justice and Intellectual Character
The need for the cultivation of intellectual virtue in the liberal framework also follows
from what Rawls holds regarding the importance of reasonableness in a democracy.
Rawls holds that, to be ‘reasonable’ one must possess ‘a capacity for a sense of justice
and for a conception of the good’. According to Rawls, this political reasonableness
has two aspects:
The ﬁrst basic aspect of the reasonable . . . is the willingness to propose fair
terms of cooperation and to abide by them provided others do. The second
basic aspect. . . is the willingness to recognize the burdens of judgement and
to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the
legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime.48
Clayton concedes that these are virtues and Rawls, too calls them ‘virtues of per-
sons’.49 It is true that Clayton calls reasonableness a ‘moral virtue’.50 However, recall
that for Rawls the reason why we must be reasonable is that we are all subject to the
burdens of judgement and that the problems of judgement are, to a large extent, epis-
temic problems: different people have different views on the good life, we do not know
which view is best and it is hard to justify one way or another what the best view is.
Furthermore, the solution that Rawls proposes is intellectual too inasmuch as reason-
able political cooperation requires a kind of thinking: seeing the point of view of the
other, negotiating with them about how to live and coming to a compromise that is
acceptable to all.
In the literature from political philosophy and from ethics, Young and Sher call rea-
sonableness a form of thinking.51 In education, Michael Pritchard discusses the virtue
of reasonableness at length. Pritchard outlines the features of reasonableness – seeking
information, thoughtfulness, open-mindedness, giving reasons, acknowledging mis-
takes, and compromise – ﬁve out of these six are straightforwardly intellectual rather
than moral.52 And Curren draws a strong connection between Rawls’s thinking about
reasonableness as the virtue required by the burdens of judgement and the classical
virtue of judgement par excellence - phronesis. For Curren – the kind of judgement that
is required in order to weigh up the different goods that we can pursue in life (for us
and for others) is Aristotle’s intellectual virtue phronesis.53
It seems that despite calling the virtues of reasonableness ‘moral’ Clayton is aware
that what is needed to be reasonable is largely an intellectual matter. He writes:
. . . one’s view is reasonable if one possesses the requisite powers of theoretical
and practical reason and one’s beliefs are the product of one’s employment of
these powers under conditions of freedom. These powers consist in the ability
to weigh evidence appropriately, draw inferences, balance competing consid-
erations, and so on. On the other hand, one’s view is epistemically unreason-
able if it is the product of practical or theoretical irrationalities, or bias due to
the social and political conditions in which one deliberates.54
In these passages, Clayton clearly recognises that being reasonable involves develop-
ing a virtuous manner and style of thinking; revealingly, he also holds that being rea-
sonable involves avoiding intellectual vices (such as irrationality and bias). Clayton
even holds that the need to inculcate this kind of rationality in children may
© 2018 The Author. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied Philosophy.
Intellectual Perfectionism about Schooling 13
sometimes over-ride our neutralism. In fact, the closest Clayton comes to endorsing
non-neutrality is in a striking passage in which he considers whether teaching the truth
about evolution does not perhaps amount to taking sides with secularism against reli-
gion. Clayton holds that, arguably, justice demands teaching evolution in this case.55 I
wholeheartedly agree and only wish to suggest that it is not justice that demands the
teaching of evolution over creationism, but good old-fashioned rationality. I think it is
not taking matters too far to hold that Rawlsian reasonableness is in fact an intellectual
virtue and that commitment to Rawlsian reasonableness implies commitment to an
intellectual perfectionist project – shaping children’s reasonableness – in school.
6.3. The Scope of Liberal Intellectual Perfectionism
The point of arguments 6.1 and 6.2 above was that political liberalism demands intel-
lectual perfectionism inasmuch as shaping children’s (1) autonomy and (2) reasonable-
ness is an exercise in perfectionist intellectual character education. However, even if
our approach to education should be intellectually perfectionist, it is still an open
question which intellectual virtues the education system should try to promote. There
are a great many intellectual virtues discussed in the literature, for instance: responsi-
bility, tenacity, open-mindedness, integrity, honesty, courage, conﬁdence, humility,
imaginativeness, curiosity, fairmindedness, autonomy, etc. Is it the task of the school
to inculcate all of these intellectual virtues or just some? Conceivably, not all of these
intellectual virtues, but only some may be needed for the political project of fostering
the liberally important virtues of autonomy and reasonableness.
Which particular intellectual virtues need to be cultivated in the promotion of
autonomy and reasonableness clearly needs working out. However, we have seen
above that autonomy already demands a range of intellectual virtues, such as: open-
mindedness, reﬂectiveness, criticality and all-round rationality. Likewise, we saw that
reasonableness demands a further range of virtues, such as open-mindedness (again),
thoughtfulness, and (even) phronesis. The intellectual perfectionist project as it is advo-
cated here is not committed to fostering the whole gamut of intellectual virtues that
one could possibly develop through education. Instead, the aim is to show that at least
some intellectual perfectionism – at least as much intellectual perfectionism as is
needed to foster autonomy and reasonableness – is politically justiﬁed.
However, it will be no great surprise if the list of intellectual virtues required to take
part in liberal politics is extensive. Firstly, notice that, inasmuch as all political discus-
sions (say, whether to vaccinate against a certain illness or not, whether to frack for nat-
ural gas, whether to devote a speciﬁed percentage of GDP to foreign aid, etc.) involve
discussion of matters of fact, liberal politics requires most of the intellectual virtues that
we need accurately to gather facts, debate solutions and implement policies. In as much
as political discussion is simply a sharing of information – or even a form of collective
decision-making as theorists of epistemic democracy contend – there seems little differ-
ence between the kind of virtues that one needs in having a political discussion in par-
ticular and simply deciding what to do in any practical area of one’s life.
Another reason why the list of the intellectual virtues that the school should incul-
cate may be reasonably extensive is that the intellectual virtues show a degree of unity;
that is the different intellectual virtues reinforce one another and are acquired as a
package. The idea that the virtues form a unity and that one cannot truly have one
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virtue without having them all is a familiar idea from ethics.56 However, one does not
need to go that far to see some basic unifying elements in the intellectual virtues.
Roberts and Wood, for instance, stress the important role of a ‘love of knowledge’ as
a foundational intellectual virtue.57 Baehr too, stresses the importance of a love of
knowledge, but holds that a love of knowledge is not a distinct virtue, as such, but
rather a motivational element of each and every virtue (such that one’s inquisitiveness,
accuracy and honesty are all driven by the same love of knowledge).58 Be that as it
may, it seems absolutely essential to being intellectually virtuous at all that one loves
knowledge (and hates ignorance). Furthermore, it is quite clear to see that liberal poli-
tics – as a form of politics in which we engage in debates about how to live and try to
convince others through reason to adopt the best way of living together – must also be
built on a love of knowledge and hatred of ignorance. Quite simply, people who do
not love knowledge, seek it and spread it have no need for debate, political or other-
wise; acceptance of ignorance closes down debate. If all intellectual virtue (and in par-
ticular the intellectual virtues we need to enable liberal politics) is motivated by a love
of knowledge, we can structure our educational efforts to teach intellectual virtue
around the central need to inculcate a love of knowledge amongst children. While
there is clearly more to be said regarding the exact content of the intellectual perfec-
tionist programme, the question which intellectual virtues in particular the school
should focus on inculcating is not a debilitating one.
6.4. Intellectual Perfectionism is Not Strong Perfectionism
Having established that at least some intellectual perfectionism is justiﬁable on politi-
cal grounds, though, it is natural to ask after the fate of the other comprehensive ide-
als, besides loving knowledge, that we could teach in school, like comprehensive ideals
in morals, aesthetics, politics or religion. Does support for intellectual perfectionism in
school entail support for perfectionism about morals, politics or religion too? No.
Regarding these things, there is ample liberal argument that we should be cautious
how much latitude we should allow to the school to shape children’s views.
(1) Different people hold vastly different ideals regarding morals, politics and reli-
gion and it will be hard to get everyone to agree on one set of such ideals.59
(2) Equality demands that the state respects everyone’s moral view equally.60
(3) It is not possible to justify comprehensive views regarding morals, politics and
religion to everyone.61
(4) Neutrality regarding morality is necessary to limit state power.62
Caution about undue state interference in shaping children’s moral, political or reli-
gious views is Clayton’s core commitment and, while Levinson’s view is a perfectionist
one, she (and other weak perfectionists like Gutmann and Fowler) stresses that hers is
a ‘minimal’ perfectionism and she remains, like Clayton a liberal opponent of enlisting
children into comprehensive positions (save the liberal comprehensive position). As
part of the ‘intellectual perfectionist’ programme, then, I propose to accept, like Clay-
ton, that the school should not attempt to shape children’s substantive view regarding
morals, politics, religion, and so forth. This is a big concession to the neutralist posi-
tion about education. In various ways, the liberal challenge in thinking about
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education concerns how to place a limit on what schools are allowed to teach in an
effort to ensure that schools do not cross a line from merely educating children into
indoctrinating them in comprehensive views that they did not choose for themselves.
The intellectual perfectionist project is simply to suggest a new place to draw that line:
schools are eminently justiﬁed in epistemic,63 but also in political terms to improve
children’s intellects; however, as many liberals hold, it is problematic for schools to
determine children’s comprehensive moral, political and religious views. Intellectual
perfectionism is simply another way to keep schools on the right side of the line
between educating and indoctrinating; after all one cannot indoctrinate a child into
thinking well, getting them to think well is simply education.
Admittedly, conﬂicts may arise between intellectually perfectionist schooling and
complete neutralism about children’s moral, religious and political commitments.
Intellectual perfectionism, for instance, requires us to teach children deep knowledge
of and respect for scientiﬁc evidence and, regarding, for instance, evolution, the scien-
tiﬁc world view can conﬂict with the religious view. In cases like these, the intellectual
perfectionist will have to bite the bullet. While it captures well the liberal idea that
schools should enable children to think for themselves and thereby reﬂects much that
liberals ﬁnd important, intellectual perfectionism is still a form of perfectionism. If
intellectual perfectionism ends up in disabusing children of ill-founded religious preju-
dices, so be it. Importantly, though, notice that when an intellectually perfectionist
teacher teaches a child to respect and love science, she does not do so with the aim of
changing a child’s religious world view per se. The science lesson may have an inﬂu-
ence on what the child ends up thinking about religion, but the broad-minded and
sympathetic science teacher does not set out to disabuse the child of religious views as
such. The good science teacher aims to convince the child, through rational demon-
stration, of a scientiﬁc fact. This may have a side consequence for the child’s religious
views, but not an effect by design. Intellectual perfectionism about schooling is the
position that a teacher may consciously and by design attempt to change one thing
about children and that is to improve their intellects. Admittedly, much will change
about children as a result of their improved intellects. But the fact that something may
change about the child’s view as a consequence of their improving intellect (say, that a
child gives up a strict literal interpretation of their religion or even gives up their reli-
gion altogether) is not to make that teaching too coercive for the liberal to accept.
Instead, it is merely to acknowledge that newly autonomous people will employ that
autonomy in different ways to think about their life.
7. Replies to Objections
One can imagine a number of possible objections to the idea that schools should be
intellectually perfectionist.
One possible objection against intellectual perfectionism stems from the cautionary
or sceptical thought that, not only in ethics and politics, but also in literature, history,
economics, art or even natural science there are a great many disputed ideas. Take a
contentious issue like whether we should teach children that the cause of World War I
was Austro-Hungarian aggression or the legacy of British Imperialism. Advocates of
both sides in this debate hold that their view is the correct one that should be taught
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to children. In the absence of consensus, how does one decide which of the rival theo-
ries to teach? Is it not politically more cautious to be neutral with regard to con-
tentious questions like these and to eschew not only moral but also intellectual
perfectionism? An intellectual perfectionism that focuses on the improvement of a style
of thinking rather than on the inculcation of particular theories, canons or collection
of facts already contains the answer to this worry. Recall that the proposal on the table
is that schools should teach children the love of knowledge and the good habits of
thinking that are essential in acquiring knowledge. The kind of intellectual perfection-
ism advocated here is not committed to the teaching of any particular piece of content
that we could doubt, but only to the promotion of children’s ability to engage in ﬁnd-
ing knowledge (for themselves and in collaboration with others), efﬁciently and well.
A second possible objection is that intellectual perfectionism would strip discussion
of interesting and important matters to do with ethics, politics or spirituality out of
school and would leave in its place only the undisputed facts. Moreover, because such
a large part of the humanities, in particular, deals with ethics, politics and the meaning
of life in the round, it may be feared that intellectual perfectionism will abandon the
school curriculum entirely to the STEM subjects. This is not the intention. Intellec-
tual perfectionism sees it as the task of the school to perfect children’s intellects and
their ability to think about the world and their place in it, rather than to direct them
to taking up one of the many comprehensive perspectives that are possible about these
matters. In our intellectual culture, there exist three well-developed forms of intellec-
tual study of ethics, politics and spirituality, viz. the subject ethics, the subject political
science and the subject theology. Study of all three of these is beneﬁcial in developing
someone’s intellectual ability to engage with questions about the right, the just and the
transcendent without necessarily forcing them to adopt a particular view. Our own
subject, philosophy, attempts the same and the standard view about the teaching of
philosophy is that the best kind of philosophical education is an education in thinking,
rather than in any particular world view. An intellectual perfectionist education, there-
fore, is entirely compatible with teaching about ethics and politics, so long as this
teaching is on the intellectual level and is aimed at fostering intellectual virtue rather
than enlisting into a particular comprehensive view.
A third possible objection is that intellectual perfectionism assumes a very rigid dis-
tinction between the moral and intellectual virtues. Granted, it is sometimes difﬁcult
to make out whether a virtue is intellectual or moral; in fact, some virtues (for instance
‘honesty’) can be both intellectual and moral virtues at once. The thought is that if the
distinction between intellectual and moral virtues does not hold up, it will be hard for
schools to know what they are allowed to teach children and what not. At worst, the
perfectionist licence provided by intellectual perfectionism may even cause a slide into
moral perfectionism too. The worry is only serious if one cannot distinguish moral
and intellectual virtues, but there are at least two good ways to draw this distinction.
Firstly, one can draw the distinction based on the agent’s motivation in demonstrating
the virtue in question. In exhibiting a moral virtue (like, for instance, kindness) one is
motivated by a distinctly moral concern – the wellbeing of another person. However,
in exhibiting an intellectual virtue (like, for instance, rigour in inquiry) one is moti-
vated not by the well-being of another, but by the love of knowledge. It is simple to
see that these motivations may diverge. The classic case can be found in the realm of
hurtful truths. My epistemic motivation – to ﬁnd out what is the fact of the matter no
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matter how anyone feels about it – may be different from my moral motivation – to
spare someone’s feelings upon ﬁnding out something hurtful. A second way to draw
the distinction is between the goods produced by intellectual and moral virtues.
According to Driver, intellectual virtues produce fundamentally epistemic goods like
truth, knowledge or understanding and the moral virtues produce moral goods, most
prominently the wellbeing of others.64 It is easy to see, again, that there are goods that
are epistemically excellent, but morally questionable. Take, for instance, nuclear ﬁs-
sion (not Driver’s example). The mastery of the physics and technology needed to
split the atom was awesome in scientiﬁc and technological terms – it represents a sig-
nal epistemic good. However, whether the discovery of nuclear ﬁssion also represents
a moral good is (at the very least) open to debate. In sum, it is entirely possible to dis-
tinguish between moral and intellectual virtue on the level of the motivation a person
acts from or the good that results from the application of that virtue, and there is little
reason to fear that the one must necessary slide into the other. If we can distinguish
intellectual and moral virtues, there is also no reason to suppose that we cannot distin-
guish what it means to teach them.
8. Conclusion
In this article, I responded seriously to the worry that liberals have about character edu-
cation in schools. I held that whether liberals should worry about character education
depends not on whether anyone has consented to it or whether it was appropriately plu-
ral, but on what kind of character education is involved. I pressed Aristotle’s original dis-
tinction between intellectual and moral virtue into service to show that what we would
today call ‘intellectual character education’ is perfectly allowable by liberal standards. I
held that even though they may not have put their ﬁnger on it, the idea that the school’s
role is intellectually, but not morally perfectionist was there all along in liberal thinking
and that the best place to draw the distinction between what the liberal school should
and should not be allowed to do in educating children is at the familiar line between
shaping children’s comprehensive conceptions about how to live and shaping their intel-
lectual ability and inclination to think well about how they might want to live.65
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